"Expungement" of Records Can Be Effected Though ICAR 32(i)

Gary Turpen was acquitted by a jury of a misdemeanor charge. He later asked the magistrate court to expunge the records reflecting "the arrest, filing and acquittal by jury." The magistrate court denied the motion and the district court affirmed.

On appeal the Supreme Court first stated that expungement does not mean the actual destruction of records; "[t]hus when we refer to "expungement" we do so in the narrower sense of 'expungement of record,' i.e., "the '[p]rocess by which [a] record of criminal conviction is destroyed or sealed . . . .' "

It then held it would not reach the question of whether the courts had inherent power to order expungement "because there is currently a court rule in place that grants the trial courts the authority to grant relief of the type that Turpen seeks. That rule is I.C.A.R. 32(i)," which "authorizes the trial court to seal or redact court records on a case-by-case basis."

"Before entering an order redacting or sealing records, the court must make one or more of the following determinations in writing:

(1) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate facts or statements, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, or
(2) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that the court finds might be libelous, or
(3) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements, the dissemination or publication of which would reasonably result in economic or financial loss or harm to a person having an interest in the documents or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, records or public property of or used by the judicial department, or
(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or statements that might threaten or endanger the life or safety of individuals."

The case was remanded for further proceedings.

State v. Turpen, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/State%20v.%20Turpen%20-%20FINAL.pdf