Be Careful What You Wish For

After observing yesterday that the Supreme Court hadn't issued any opinions for awhile, it issues three today. The first, Thompson v. Clear Springs Foods, involves worker's compensation law, which is not a concern of SCOIDBlog. (Here's a link in case you're interested in the personal comfort doctrine: http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Thompson%20v.%20Clear%20Springs%20Opinion.pdf)


The second opinion is a parental termination case where dad pleaded guilty to felony injury to child (not one of his children, but someone -- presumably a police officer -- pretending to be a twelve-year old in an internet chatroom) in 2005 and was placed on probation. During probation, father was prevented from having contact with his children by SANE or the mother or both. In 2008, mother remarried and three days later filed a petition for termination of father's parental rights. The magistrate court dismissed the petition finding that the mother had not shown that the father willfully abandoned his children. The Supreme Court affirmed finding that "[t]he magistrate's finding that the Petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father had willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the children is supported by substantial and competent evidence."


In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption of: Jane Doe, John Doe, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Doe%20v.pdf


Here's the part that may be useful to criminal defense lawyers. The Court finds that someone can't willfully do something (in this case abandon his children) if he didn't have the ability to do otherwise. It wrote: "In order to prove that Father had abandoned the children, Petitioners had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had 'willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship' with the children. For one to willfully fail to do something, he or she must have the ability to do it." (Citations and emphasis omitted.) This is good language to use in your next probation violation where your client wants to comply with the terms of probation but just can't get it done due to outside forces.


The last Supreme Court opinion today is State v. Munoz. http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/State%20v.%20Munoz%20Opinion.pdf. The Supreme Court affirms the denial of a motion to suppress, but does not address the central question in the Court of Appeals opinion, i.e., What is a court to do when a police officer testifies to two different versions of the same event? The district court did not pick between the two versions, reasoning that under either version the evidence should not be suppressed. (This resolution ignores the possibility of a third choice, i.e., that neither version is true.) The Court of Appeals found that neither version was credible as the differences in testimony were inconsistent, irreconcilable and unexplained and found the state did not carry its burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement. (See March 28, 2009 SCOIDBlog.) The Supreme Court picked one of the two versions and affirmed because there was substantial evidence to support that version. It notes: "Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court."

This analysis, it seems to me, begs the question. First, the district court didn't pick one version over the other. It found that under either version the search was proper. So the district court never made a credibility determination and there is no credibility determination for the Supreme Court to defer to. And, under the second version, the search was improper under Arizona v. Gant. So it matters which version, if either, is believed. Although neither version is worth much in my view, the Court should have let the district court make the credibility call.