The COA issued its opinion in Hughes v. State today. It's 31 pages long and will take some time to digest. Here's a link for those who want to start chewing on it. http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/hughes%20opinion.pdf.
In short the Court rejects or avoids numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In particular, the petitioner alleged IAC for: 1) failing to be present during the Psychosexual Evaluation; 2) failing to move to suppress the PSE because the polygraph results, which were incorporated therein, were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel; 3) failing to ensure that he received Miranda warnings prior to his participation in the PSI; 4) failing to obtain an independent, confidential PSE evaluation prior to sentencing; 5)failing to move to suppress the results of the polygraph test; and 6) failing to advise Hughes regarding his rights relative to the PSE.
The court rejects #1-3 and 5. It does not reach the issue in #4 because the trial counsel asked for an independent evaluation and the trial court's refusal to authorize one should have been raised on direct appeal.
As to #6, the Court sets out a new test on how to analyze whether the petitioner was prejudiced in an Estrada IAC claim. The COA writes:
"We turn to the question of how the Strickland prejudice prong should be applied with regard to the unique circumstances of a PSE. We conclude that there are three essential factors which make up the prejudice determination in this context. The first factor is whether the content of the PSE itself is materially unfavorable. The PSE should be reviewed to determine the extent and harmful character of statements and admissions made by the applicant and the conclusions of the evaluator based upon those statements and admissions to determine the level of negativity, if any. If the PSE is not materially unfavorable, then the second prong of the Strickland standard has not been met. If the PSE is materially unfavorable to the applicant, the level of its negativity will then be weighed with two additional factors. The second factor is the extent of the sentencing court‟s reliance on the PSE if it can be demonstrated from the record. The third factor is the totality of the evidence before the sentencing court." (Emphasis added.)
The Court applied these factors and concludes there was no prejudice in Hughes's case.
There will be "Further Thoughts" on this case in a day or two.
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
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