Today the Court of Appeals held the City of Wendell's curfew ordinance is unconstiutionally overbroad. In the Interest of John Doe, Docket No. 35004. In Doe, the ordinance at issue only provided exceptions if: (1) the minor was accompanied by a parent, or (2) the minor was on an emergency errand, or (3) if the minor was involved in other legitimate business as directed by their parents or school. Holding the ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad, the Court did not evaluate Doe's other two challenges to the ordinance (void for vagueness and equal protection challenge).
Importantly, the Court of Appeals adopted a method of analysis for determining whether the overbreadth of a curfew ordinance is "real and substantial." The method of analysis is "whether the curfew ordinance or statute is so broadly written that it unduly restricts the exercise of First Amendment activities to a degree determined to be unacceptable." In sum, the Court held "by failing to provide an exception for First Amendment rights, the ordinance does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control but rather sweeps within its ambit other activities that consitute an exercise of First Amendment rights."
The opinion also contains an interesting analysis of appellate jurisdiction and Rule 12, I.A.R. In Doe, Judge Ingram denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss. After accepting the juvenile's conditional admission, the court orally certified the constitutional challenge for appeal prior to disposition. Afterwards, the district court entertained Doe's appeal and rendered a decision on the merits.
Noting Doe failed to strictly abide by Rule 12, the Court noted "not all flaws in the appellate process are jurisdictional as the state asserts." The Court held "the failure to obtain the permission of the district court in this interlocutory appeal did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the state's failure to raise this procedural objection in the district court waived the issue. Under these circumstances, we will treat this appeal as an appeal by permission under I.A.R. 12." Rejecting the State's challenge, the Court of Appeal noted Rule 12, I.A.R. and I.C. 20-528 are independent vehicles for seeking appellate review of juvenile matters.
Prost to Dave Heida!
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Doe,%2035004.pdf
Tuesday, March 31, 2009
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