The Court of Appeals held today that a defendant's inability to pay restitution may be considered a factor in setting the sentence, although it cannot be the sole factor in imposing imprisonment.
In State v. James Todd, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/todd35012.pdf, the Court upheld a sentence imposed in a grand theft case which was based in part on Mr. Todd's inability to repay the $57,000 in purloined funds. But, as it was "by no means the only factor considered by the district court" and other factors supported the sentence, it was a permissible consideration.
While I can see how the ability to pay restitution is a mitigating circumstance at sentencing per I.C. 19-2521(2)(f), I fail to see why it should ever be considered an aggravating factor. Isn't that just getting a larger dose of punishment because you're poor? Without getting all legally-sophisticated about it: That ain't right.
It seems to me that the inability to pay, unless voluntary on the part of the defendant, is irrelevant to the sentencing decision. Moreover, consideration of it to justify imprisonment, even in part, is bad public policy. Classism is not an ethically solid basis from which to impose sentences irrespective of whether, as the COA holds, it is not a violation of due process or equal protection.
Tuesday, March 3, 2009
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