Sunday, October 3, 2010

Judge's Ruling Admitting Highly Prejudicial Evidence The Week Before Trial Did Not Require Continuance Where No Specific Prejudice Was Shown.

The Court has affirmed the first-degree murder conviction of Donna Thorgren. This case presented the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to continue a trial when it changed its mind about the admissibility of highly inculpatory evidence a week before it was set to start.

Donna Thorngren was charged by the grand jury with murdering her husband. Her son, Austin, was indicted as an accessory. The cases were severed for trial because the State wanted to introduce a statement the son made to his friend. According to the Court: "The statement occurred after a conversation between Donna and Austin in a shed outside Donna's mother's home on the day Curtis was murdered, but before his body was discovered. Ketterling entered the shed shortly after Donna left and found Austin visibly shaken. When Ketterling asked Austin what was wrong, he said 'I think my mom did it.' "

At the motion to sever, the court said that the statement "would not be admissible as against Donna."

One week before trial, the district court changed its ruling and held that the statement would be admissible as an excited utterance. Donna filed a motion for continuance arguing the changed ruling impaired her trial strategy. The motion was denied by the district court. Donna was convicted.

On appeal, she argued that: 1) the statement was not an excited utterance; 2) her right to due process was violated when the court changed its ruling only a week before trial; and 3) the court should have granted the motion to continue.

The Court rejected all three arguments. It first held that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statement even though it was made in response to a question and not a spontaneous statement. "The question in this case does not undermine its spontaneity because Ketterling asked a[n] . . . open-ended question ('what was wrong') to which Austin briefly replied 'I think my mom did it.' Because the question was not specific or leading, and because Austin's response was brief and made while emotionally unsettled, the statement does not lack spontaneity or bear other indicia of reflective thought."

Second, the Court found that Donna's reliance on the pretrial ruling was not justified thus her due process rights were not violated when the court changed its mind. It explained: "The district court's initial 'ruling' on the shed statement merely served as a backdrop for its determination of the motion to sever the trials, and was not a definitive ruling on the ultimate admissibility of the shed statement." It stated that "[b]ecause the pretrial ruling in this case was not definitive on the issue of the admissibility of the shed statement, but rather concerned whether Donna and Austin should be tried separately, Donna was not in a position to 'sensibly rely' on the definitiveness of the ruling[.]" "Moreover," it continued, "even if the district court did definitively rule on the admissibility of the shed statement, a party must be mindful of a court's discretion to change its own pretrial rulings, especially evidentiary rulings."

Third, the Court found that Donna did not demonstrate that her substantial rights were prejudiced by the denial of the motion to continue. The only specific argument made in support of the motion was that counsel had not sufficiently prepared to impeach Ketterling's testimony. "However, Ketterling was thoroughly impeached at trial, which supports a finding of no prejudice" and, "Donna's failure to raise and pursue the issue immediately after her conviction and before sentencing, provides additional assurance that Donna suffered no prejudice as a result of this ruling."

Here's a link to the opinion. http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Thorngren%20opinion.pdf

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