Court Holds Sex Offender Registration Law Does Not Infringe on Right to Travel

Richard Yeoman was convicted of rape in Washington in 1984 and was required to register as a sex offender there. He moved to Idaho in 2007, did not register and was charged with failing to register as a sex offender. He entered a conditional plea of guilty reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.

Yeoman made two arguments on appeal: 1) That the sex offender registration law did not apply to him because he was convicted before July 1, 1993, the effective date of the statute; and 2) That, if the statute applies, his constitutional right to travel was violated. Today, the Supreme Court rejected both arguments.

As to the first argument, the Court wrote:

"When construing Idaho Code § 18-8304 as a whole, subsection (1)(c) is not limited to crimes for which the person was convicted on or after July 1, 1993. Subsection (1)(c) incorporates by reference "the offenses listed in subsection (1)(a) of this section." (Emphasis added). Subsection (1)(a) applies to any person who "[o]n or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section . . . 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101(1) . . .) . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Subsection (1)(c) does not incorporate by reference the convictions listed in subsection (1)(a); it incorporates by reference the offenses listed. The offenses are listed by reference to their respective code sections. The date of conviction for one of those offenses is not part of the definition of the crime as set forth in the code section. The date a person was convicted of a crime does not become part of the definition of the offense for which he or she was convicted. Therefore, subsection (1)(c) applies to Defendant."

As to the second argument, the Court tartly wrote that "[b]ecause [Mr. Yeoman] was required to register while residing in Washington, it is difficult to see how the requirement that he register in this State in any way infringed upon his right to travel to or become a resident of this State." It then went on to state that even assuming that the registration requirement imposed a penalty on Mr. Yeoman's right to change residence, it was still valid because it was necessary to promote a compelling state interest. i.e., the "strong interest in preventing future sexual offenses and alerting local law enforcement and citizens to the whereabouts of those that could reoffend."

State v. Yeoman, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/State%20v.%20Yeoman%20OPINION.pdf