Suspect's Silence Does Not Invoke Miranda Right to Remain Silent

The United States Supreme Court held today that a suspect's silence during a interrogation did not invoke his right to remain silent. Just as a suspect’s Miranda right to counsel must be invoked "unambiguously" under Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452 (1994), if the accused makes an "ambiguous or equivocal" statement or no statement as to his right to remain silent, the police are not required to end the interrogation or ask questions to clarify the accused’s intent.

The suspect, Van Chester Thompkins, was arrested and then Mirandized. Two officers then interrogated him for three hours about a fatal shooting. While mostly silent during the interrogation, Thompkins never said that he wanted to remain silent or that he wanted an attorney. Eventually, he answered "yes" when asked if he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting.

The state courts found there was no Miranda violation as did the federal district court on habeas review. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state courts erred in finding an implied waiver of Thompkins’ right to remain silent. The Supreme Court reversed.

It found that Thompkins never unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent and further waived that right when he made the "yes" statement to police. Thus, it appears that if the state can establish that Miranda warnings were given and understood by the suspect, a later uncoerced statement will establish an implied waiver.

The Court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a limiting instruction because Thompson could not show the error, if any, prejudiced him.

Berghuis v. Thompkins, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1470.pdf