Wait Time Before Forcible Entry Pursuant to Search Warrant Must Be Reasonable in Light of Exigency

"Sittin' and starin' out of the hotel window.
Got a tip they're gonna kick the door in again.
I'd like to get some sleep before I travel,
but if you got a warrant, I guess you're gonna come in."

In State v. Kofoed, the Fruitland police walk up to the door of a workshop with a search warrant to search it and outbuildings for drugs and for evidence of meth manufacturing. The police knock, wait two seconds and then announce "Sheriff's Office, search warrant!" "They then heard a sound like something was dropped or kicked and then footsteps moving quickly away from the door. . . . The time lapse between the officer announcing his authority and purpose and his opening of the door was about four seconds."



The Supreme Court holds that the sounds created an exigency, i.e., the possible destruction of evidence and that the four seconds was a a reasonable amount of time to wait before entering. "Because the exigency justifies an entry to prevent the destruction of evidence, a reasonable wait time would be less than the time the officers reasonably suspected it would take to do so." And that's not the time needed to destroy all the evidence, or even some of it, because "[t]he police do not have to wait at the door in order to give the suspect time to destroy some of the evidence."



The result is not surprising given the recitation of facts. An interesting sidelight is that Kofoed didn't specifically argue that the method of entry violated the Idaho Constitution. In footnote two of the opinion the Supreme Court notes: "Kofoed did not argue below that either Article I, § 17, of the Idaho Constitution or Idaho Code § 19-4409 provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment." This might have made a big difference to Kofoed because the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence, Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), while it is required for violations of the Idaho Constitution and the knock and announce statute. State v. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628, 130 P.2d 1166 (Ct. App. 2005). Thus, had a violation been found, there would not have been a suppression remedy because the Idaho Constitution's exclusionary rule was not raised and argued. Of course, the Supreme Court is not bound by Ramos, but the issue has to be raised to preserve it for appeal before either the Supreme Court or COA.

Read the opinion at:
http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/State%20v.%20Kofoed.pdf