First, the Supreme Court adopts the retroactivity rules set out in Teague v. Lane and then applies those rules retroactively to hold that Ring v. Arizona does not apply retroactively to death sentenced petitioners. In re: Rhoades/McKinney/ Pizzuto/Card/Hairston v. State, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Rhoades%20etc.%20v.%20State,%2035187.pdf.
Also, the Court affirmed the summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition. First, the Court held that although the district court improperly failed to provide Ridgley with notice of the grounds upon which Ridgley’s first five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were dismissed, the error was harmless. It then held that the district court properly dismissed Ridgley’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to determine Ridgley’s competence to enter a plea of guilty. It noted that "Ridgley did not present an expert's opinion that he was not competent, as defined by I.C. § 18-210, at the time he pled guilty." And then concluded that "[i]n the absence of admissible evidence showing a reasonable probability that he was incompetent at the time of his plea of guilty, we conclude that Ridgley failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to his claim that his attorney's deficient performance resulted in prejudice."
Ridgley v. State, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Ridgley%20v.%20State,%2035823.pdf.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Tuesday, March 16, 2010
Their Aim is Askew?
To riff off Elvis Costello: "Oh I used to be disgusted and now I try to be amused." But since I read this here new case, you know, I got an old-time case of the blues.State v. Cantrell, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/cantrell%20opinion.pdf
More on this later.
Be Careful What You Wish For
After observing yesterday that the Supreme Court hadn't issued any opinions for awhile, it issues three today. The first, Thompson v. Clear Springs Foods, involves worker's compensation law, which is not a concern of SCOIDBlog. (Here's a link in case you're interested in the personal comfort doctrine: http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Thompson%20v.%20Clear%20Springs%20Opinion.pdf)
The second opinion is a parental termination case where dad pleaded guilty to felony injury to child (not one of his children, but someone -- presumably a police officer -- pretending to be a twelve-year old in an internet chatroom) in 2005 and was placed on probation. During probation, father was prevented from having contact with his children by SANE or the mother or both. In 2008, mother remarried and three days later filed a petition for termination of father's parental rights. The magistrate court dismissed the petition finding that the mother had not shown that the father willfully abandoned his children. The Supreme Court affirmed finding that "[t]he magistrate's finding that the Petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father had willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the children is supported by substantial and competent evidence."
In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption of: Jane Doe, John Doe, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Doe%20v.pdf
Here's the part that may be useful to criminal defense lawyers. The Court finds that someone can't willfully do something (in this case abandon his children) if he didn't have the ability to do otherwise. It wrote: "In order to prove that Father had abandoned the children, Petitioners had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had 'willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship' with the children. For one to willfully fail to do something, he or she must have the ability to do it." (Citations and emphasis omitted.) This is good language to use in your next probation violation where your client wants to comply with the terms of probation but just can't get it done due to outside forces.
The last Supreme Court opinion today is State v. Munoz. http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/State%20v.%20Munoz%20Opinion.pdf. The Supreme Court affirms the denial of a motion to suppress, but does not address the central question in the Court of Appeals opinion, i.e., What is a court to do when a police officer testifies to two different versions of the same event? The district court did not pick between the two versions, reasoning that under either version the evidence should not be suppressed. (This resolution ignores the possibility of a third choice, i.e., that neither version is true.) The Court of Appeals found that neither version was credible as the differences in testimony were inconsistent, irreconcilable and unexplained and found the state did not carry its burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement. (See March 28, 2009 SCOIDBlog.) The Supreme Court picked one of the two versions and affirmed because there was substantial evidence to support that version. It notes: "Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court."
This analysis, it seems to me, begs the question. First, the district court didn't pick one version over the other. It found that under either version the search was proper. So the district court never made a credibility determination and there is no credibility determination for the Supreme Court to defer to. And, under the second version, the search was improper under Arizona v. Gant. So it matters which version, if either, is believed. Although neither version is worth much in my view, the Court should have let the district court make the credibility call.
The second opinion is a parental termination case where dad pleaded guilty to felony injury to child (not one of his children, but someone -- presumably a police officer -- pretending to be a twelve-year old in an internet chatroom) in 2005 and was placed on probation. During probation, father was prevented from having contact with his children by SANE or the mother or both. In 2008, mother remarried and three days later filed a petition for termination of father's parental rights. The magistrate court dismissed the petition finding that the mother had not shown that the father willfully abandoned his children. The Supreme Court affirmed finding that "[t]he magistrate's finding that the Petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father had willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with the children is supported by substantial and competent evidence."
In the Matter of the Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption of: Jane Doe, John Doe, http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/Doe%20v.pdf
Here's the part that may be useful to criminal defense lawyers. The Court finds that someone can't willfully do something (in this case abandon his children) if he didn't have the ability to do otherwise. It wrote: "In order to prove that Father had abandoned the children, Petitioners had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had 'willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship' with the children. For one to willfully fail to do something, he or she must have the ability to do it." (Citations and emphasis omitted.) This is good language to use in your next probation violation where your client wants to comply with the terms of probation but just can't get it done due to outside forces.
The last Supreme Court opinion today is State v. Munoz. http://www.isc.idaho.gov/opinions/State%20v.%20Munoz%20Opinion.pdf. The Supreme Court affirms the denial of a motion to suppress, but does not address the central question in the Court of Appeals opinion, i.e., What is a court to do when a police officer testifies to two different versions of the same event? The district court did not pick between the two versions, reasoning that under either version the evidence should not be suppressed. (This resolution ignores the possibility of a third choice, i.e., that neither version is true.) The Court of Appeals found that neither version was credible as the differences in testimony were inconsistent, irreconcilable and unexplained and found the state did not carry its burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement. (See March 28, 2009 SCOIDBlog.) The Supreme Court picked one of the two versions and affirmed because there was substantial evidence to support that version. It notes: "Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court."
This analysis, it seems to me, begs the question. First, the district court didn't pick one version over the other. It found that under either version the search was proper. So the district court never made a credibility determination and there is no credibility determination for the Supreme Court to defer to. And, under the second version, the search was improper under Arizona v. Gant. So it matters which version, if either, is believed. Although neither version is worth much in my view, the Court should have let the district court make the credibility call.
Monday, March 15, 2010
Jeffrey Toobin on Justice Stevens
Our Supreme Court hasn't issued an opinion for a few weeks now. While we wait here's an interesting profile of Justice Stevens on the eve of his anticipated retirement by Jeffrey Toobin.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=124597191
And here's a link to an interview of Toobin on the NPR program Fresh Air.
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Peterson Named Kootenai Magistrate
Defense attorney Clark Peterson has been selected to be the new Kootenai County Magistrate Judge.Clark is a partner at Amendola & Doty in Coeur d'Alene and was previously a Chief Deputy District Attorney in Las Vegas. Clark graduated at the top of his class at the Loyola (Los Angeles) School of Law and was an editor of the law review there.
Congratulations Clark.
IACDL Seminar this Friday-Saturday!
Head over to the Sun Valley Inn for the Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Winter Seminar. The main focus of the conference is on how to litigate false confession cases. This is an important topic as we are learning through the DNA exoneration cases that actually innocent people are being manipulated by law enforcement into falsely confessing. Several experts will speak on that topic. There will also be an ethics session and updates on recent Idaho caselaw and pending legislation.
The Winter Seminar is also a great place to socialize with your fellow criminal defense lawyers. I can't wait to see who wins the Cockroach Award this year! See you there.
The Winter Seminar is also a great place to socialize with your fellow criminal defense lawyers. I can't wait to see who wins the Cockroach Award this year! See you there.
Saturday, February 27, 2010
ABA Opinion Re: Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence v. Constitutional Duty to Disclose
This summer, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued an formal opinion regarding the scope of a prosecutor's ethical duty under Model Rule 3.8(d) to disclose exculaptory evidence and information. As you know, Rule 3.8(d) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct mirrors that of the ABA Model Rules, and provides:
Of importance, the opinion concludes a prosecutors duty under Rule 3.8(d) is independent and broader than that imposed pursuant to Brady and the due process clause. Focusing on the history of the rule, the opinion notes:
1.) It is not limited to evidence that is "material" and there is not a "de minimis" exception." Thus, the prosecutor must turn over all information even if they believe that it "has only a minimal tendency to negate the defendant's fuilt, or that the favorable evidence is highly unreliable."
2.) The duty to disclose is not limited to admissible evidence, and includes information that may be inadmissible.
3.) Disclosure must be made "as soon as reasonably practical" once it is known to the prosecutor.
4.) Rule 3.8(d) is non-waivable, and a "prosecutor may not solicit, accept or rely on the defendant's consent" as a means to avoid their ethical obligation.
The opinion notes the obligation extends to favorable evidence known to the prosecutor. Knowledge is defined as actual knowledge that may be inferred from the circumstance. While the Rule does not impose a duty to ascertain exculpatory evidence, the opinion notes a prosecutor may not ignore the obvious.
In addition, the opinion explores the ethical obligation of supervisors and disclosure for sentencing.
Of importance, the commentary to Rule 3.8, I.R.C.P., does not contain a discussion of Idaho's rule or the scope thereof. Accordingly, the ABA opinion should be persuasive guidance for Idaho courts. As a practical matter, it may be helpful to include a copy or cite of the opinion in all future discovery request to alert the State to their enhanced ethical obligation of disclosure.
The text of the opinon can be found at: http://www.abanet.org/cpr/09-454.pdf. Further, the Winter 2010 issue of ABA Criminal Justice contains a useful discussion of the recent opinion. (Vol. 24, No.4, pages 41-44).
"The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating infomration known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal."
Of importance, the opinion concludes a prosecutors duty under Rule 3.8(d) is independent and broader than that imposed pursuant to Brady and the due process clause. Focusing on the history of the rule, the opinion notes:
1.) It is not limited to evidence that is "material" and there is not a "de minimis" exception." Thus, the prosecutor must turn over all information even if they believe that it "has only a minimal tendency to negate the defendant's fuilt, or that the favorable evidence is highly unreliable."
2.) The duty to disclose is not limited to admissible evidence, and includes information that may be inadmissible.
3.) Disclosure must be made "as soon as reasonably practical" once it is known to the prosecutor.
4.) Rule 3.8(d) is non-waivable, and a "prosecutor may not solicit, accept or rely on the defendant's consent" as a means to avoid their ethical obligation.
The opinion notes the obligation extends to favorable evidence known to the prosecutor. Knowledge is defined as actual knowledge that may be inferred from the circumstance. While the Rule does not impose a duty to ascertain exculpatory evidence, the opinion notes a prosecutor may not ignore the obvious.
In addition, the opinion explores the ethical obligation of supervisors and disclosure for sentencing.
Of importance, the commentary to Rule 3.8, I.R.C.P., does not contain a discussion of Idaho's rule or the scope thereof. Accordingly, the ABA opinion should be persuasive guidance for Idaho courts. As a practical matter, it may be helpful to include a copy or cite of the opinion in all future discovery request to alert the State to their enhanced ethical obligation of disclosure.
The text of the opinon can be found at: http://www.abanet.org/cpr/09-454.pdf. Further, the Winter 2010 issue of ABA Criminal Justice contains a useful discussion of the recent opinion. (Vol. 24, No.4, pages 41-44).
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